Homicide, Firearms and the AIC
by SSAA (Vic) Research Team
November 2000
Introduction
On 26 July 2000 Senator Amanda Vanstone, Minister for Justice and Customs, released an Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) paper entitled The Licensing and Registration Status of Firearms Used in Homicide. The paper was dated May 2000.
The AIC paper is an intriguing document. Equally intriguing are the nature, wording and timing of Minister Vanstone's Media Release.
A number of questions and criticisms could and should be raised about other similar AIC publications. This short article offers some brief observations on the quality of AIC firearm-related research and on the government's use of that product.
Background
The so-called National Agreement on Firearms (NAF) was forced through in a matter of days and in circumstances of high emotion in 1996. The available public record does not indicate that any consideration was given to matters such as tangible benefits, total costs, alternative options, compliance, enforcement or undesirable consequences. The decision-making process appears to have been quite unprecedented in modern times in terms of the manner and the urgency with which it was prosecuted.
Minister Vanstone's Media Release of 26 July 2000
Minister Vanstone announced: "Clearly this AIC paper confirms the Federal Government was correct in introducing tougher penalties to deter people from importing prohibited goods such as firearms."
Nowhere does the AIC paper "confirm" the "correctness" of those rapidly introduced policies and it is difficult to understand why the Minister finds it necessary to assert that it does.
Minister Vanstone says, "The licensing, registration, and storage requirements imposed by the new firearms regulations have significantly restricted the availability and access to certain firearms." Clearly they restricted legal access, but how did they affect illegal access, and at what cost and with what measurable beneficial effects? The AIC paper is too narrowly focused to begin to answer such questions.
Minister Vanstone refers to Australian Bureau of Statistics data and says, "the use of firearms in homicides in the calendar year 1999 fell to its lowest level since 1995…". The Minister does not mention that the level was lower still in 1994 prior to the NAF. Her statement is written in a context suggesting that her government's firearm policies have produced something of value. While the "use of" firearms "fell" as described, this outcome is the arithmetical consequence of the increase in firearms related homicides being proportionately smaller than the increase in the number of homicides committed with other implements. This is no measure of the 'success' of legislation directed against firearm owners, or any other form of government intervention.
Extrapolation of the 'trend' Minister Vanstone identifies would see more numerous firearm-related homicides combined with an increased incidence of total homicide. If this is the result of her government's 'confirmed correct' gun controls and other policy interventions then it is an appalling outcome.
Minister Vanstone details isolated decreases in the "use of" firearms in robberies and in the "proportion of" firearms used in armed robberies. Again she fails to note that such decreases are primarily the result of rising total robberies and armed robberies.
It is interesting that the Minister closed her press release with the following: "While these are welcome developments, we should all remember that those at the frontline of fighting crime, who daily face the risks posed by firearms and other dangerous weapons, are sons, daughters, parents and partners. Whenever we talk about crime statistics, it is appropriate to remember the valuable contribution of our police men and women."
Remembering policemen and women, sons and daughters, parents and partners and even small children too has nothing to do with the lessons to be learned from the objective analysis of crime statistics. Recourse to homilies and verbal imagery contributes little to the processes of rational decision making and sometimes is a sign that suitable evidence is lacking.
The AIC paper
The AIC paper, number 151 in an AIC series named Trends and Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice, is hereafter referred to as T&I 151.
Some Improvements in Quality
T&I 151 incorporates a reduced reliance on the work of high profile 'anti-gun' activists in comparison with previous AIC work. Whereas the AIC formerly adopted the notion of Gun Control Australia (GCA) that a "mass murder" should be taken to comprise any instance involving two or more victims, T&I 151 accepts four victims or more as an appropriate threshold. One can only speculate about the reasons behind Gun Control Australia's definition but presumably it was adopted for the purpose of claiming that there was a large number of "mass murders" in Australia and possibly to capitalise for GCA's own lobbying purposes upon imagery of gross carnage.
Most dictionaries define 'mass' (in this context) to mean 'a large number'. Is two a large number? Objective research tries to avoid the use of ambiguous or misleading terminology.
Although T&I 151 includes extended coverage of a study conducted by anti-gun activist Philip Alpers, it does incorporate a footnote to point out that Alpers's contrary results were the consequence of his choosing a specially selected three-year time period. Objective research tries to avoid the use of atypical figures selected to support pre-formed beliefs.
Some Continuing Quality Problems
Independent international research has shown that many studies relating to firearms and crime are of questionable quality. In particular, some of the research appearing in medical journals and in federal government reports has been strongly criticised.
A few areas in which material of questionable value is sometimes advanced are mentioned below.
A focus on firearm homicides (or suicides) often without serious regard to movements in total homicides (or suicides)
Reductions in the incidence of firearm-related homicide or suicide are beneficial if and only if they are accompanied by commensurate decreases in the incidence of total homicide or suicide.
It is critically important that research produced for policy purposes should comprehend such factors as method substitution in homicide or suicide. Failure to do so can encourage a form of tunnel vision that is particularly inimical to the development of soundly based policy interventions.
Reluctance or inability to test for statistical significance
It is important to test whether differences in numbers are statistically significant. It is important to test for explanatory factors. It is not uncommon for some researchers or organisations to simply assume that some differences in some numbers are significant and then assume such differences are caused by gun laws and not by other factors.
T&I 151 says "Most importantly, however, Australia has recorded no mass murders in each of the two years after the Port Arthur incident" (sic). Emphatic observations of this kind raise many questions. What possible statistical significance attaches to such data? In what way was the concept of regression to the mean taken into account? Are "mass murders" committed without the use of firearms (such as arson and gassing) not to be considered?
The use of flawed and potentially misleading international comparisons
If international comparisons are to be attempted, for whatever reason, they should at least recognise that differences between nations extend beyond gun laws. The significance of relevant historical, cultural, racial, drug-related and socio-economic factors should be considered. If data for countries with high levels of gun ownership and low levels of crime are not addressed then an impression can be created that the comparison is both simplistic and contrived. But regardless, such comparisons are useless for establishing causal connections and they are of no value in assessing the impact of firearms ownership or controls on crime, or vice versa.
Minister Vanstone draws attention to the comparisons included in T&I 151 without mentioning their specious character.
Use of poor quality and highly restricted reference sources
Professional research organisations should ensure that the sources they quote are of quality sufficient to withstand scrutiny. If they are not, then the results drawn from low quality sources can rightly be the subject of question or criticism.
Similarly, professional research organisations should acknowledge important published research that contradicts their own findings and explain why their own data sets and methodologies are to be preferred. In academic circles, any consistent failure to do this would normally raise questions about professional standards.
Policy Implications in the AIC Paper
If research organisations are to offer policy advice to governments then one would hope that this would be based on rational arguments deriving from competent and objective analysis.
T&I 151 looks at the types of firearm used to commit homicide over the period July 1992 to June 1999. It concludes: "the use of categories C and D firearms has remained relatively stable over the years". In other words, the most costly component of the NAF, the so-called firearm buy back, had no discernible effect in terms of reducing homicides committed with firearms of the types confiscated. The AIC paper does not comment on this aspect of its numbers.
T&I 151 speculates that the NAF "may have possibly contributed to the dramatic rise in handgun homicides in the last few years". The speculation is confused, improbable and irrelevant, so much so that a special note is made about it towards the end of this paper. The AIC having found that "not one handgun used in homicide was registered" , it seems reasonable to infer those committing homicide with illegal, unregistered handguns in these years did so in preference to using illegal, unregistered (possibly shortened) longarms for the purpose. It would also seem to follow that it is highly unlikely such persons would have been much attracted to the benefits of complying with licensing or registration laws of any description, either pre-NAF or post-NAF.
Having received the AIC paper, Minister Vanstone says: "the problem therefore appears to be handguns that are diverted illegally into the black market for criminal use". However, T&I 151 offered no material evidence about the diversion of handguns onto the black market. It did say "One of the main methods of illegal acquisition of firearms by individuals is through theft from gun dealers, owners or others." In partial support of this opinion the author cited her own work. On the subject of stolen firearms the earlier work had the following to say: "More often than not professional thieves target gun shops and steal pistols which are then sold on the black market." The reference is entirely circular - it is equivalent to "my statement is true because I said something like it once before".
It is arguable that by far the largest accretions to the size of the firearm black market, and to the profits to be made within it, have derived from government decisions to declare illegal many formerly widely legal forms of firearm ownership. Thefts from legal owners and dealers could well be minuscule by comparison.
T&I 151 reported that in some recent years there were approximately 12 more victims of homicide committed with handguns than was the case in some earlier years. The AIC provided no evidence to suggest that any of the unregistered handguns used in these homicides had recently been added to the pool of illegal firearms. It provided no evidence that those committing homicide with handguns acquired them from "professional thieves". It provided no evidence to indicate what contribution thefts from dealers' stocks or of other legally owned firearms might make to the total pool of illegally owned firearms.
Nonetheless, the AIC recommended "a greater focus should be directed towards enforcement and monitoring of compliance (with the storage provisions for legal firearms)" and it questioned whether some dealers had a "genuine need" (sic) to maintain such high levels of stock. It made these recommendations without any regard to the scope for their potential effectiveness and without any regard to their costs. It did not consider, as a guide, whether the implementation of yet more extreme measures, such as the complete handgun ban in the UK, had been effective in any meaningful sense. It did not consider whether its recommended measures were likely to lead to an increased use of sawn-off versions of more lethal and more readily available illegal and unregistered longarms.
Minister Vanstone raised with the Australasian Police Ministers' Council the alleged "disturbing increase in the diversion of handguns into illegal use". Given the history of previous matters referred to the APMC this suggests the likelihood of another peremptory government move against lawful firearm owners. As before, the grounds for any such move would essentially be based on wishful thinking rather than on material evidence or any consideration of benefits and costs.
T&I 151 also recommends that a "stronger emphasis needs to be placed on initiatives targeting illicit firearms trafficking". This recommendation followed a description of Australia's involvement in the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on the Elaboration of a Convention against Transnational Organised Crime. The extent to which transnational organised crime is an important factor in homicides in Australia is not discussed. It is not unknown for the formulation of window dressing recommendations of this type to be made for a range of reasons, including maintenance of an internal momentum already generated.
Unsubstantiated and clearly inaccurate:
Some of the more obvious deficiencies of this paper have been outlined, but one assertion is so representative of what appears to be a prevailing official attitude towards firearm owners that it demands treatment by itself.
The paper says:
Since the introduction of the NAF in 1996, there appears to have been a noticeable increase in the proportion of homicides committed with handguns (the numbers are then given).These findings suggest that with the licensing, registration, and storage requirements imposed by the new firearms regulations, the availability and access to firearms in Categories B to H for some persons has been significantly restricted or limited. In other words, such persons may not be deemed to be "a fit and proper person", hence prohibiting them from obtaining a firearms licence and a firearm(s) legitimately. As a consequence, those individuals turn to illegitimate means of firearms acquisition, especially firearms that are easily concealable firearms (sic), such as handguns. This may have possibly contributed to the dramatic rise in handgun homicides recorded in Australia in the last few years.
This remarkable (and unsubstantiated) statement tells us that the new firearm restrictions, particularly on handguns (Category H), have made it very difficult for people trying to become licensed owners. Yet the truth is that existing very tight laws already curbed handgun ownership. The NAF did not address handgun legislation with a view to making handguns less accessible as at the time the laws were viewed as being restrictive enough already. Hence, to begin with, the AIC contention is erroneous.
The extract suggests that people who pre-NAF would have sought a licence to obtain and use a firearm for illicit purposes are now prevented from obtaining one. Instead, these same people are said to buy handguns on the black market to commit murders with them.
If this were correct, the statistics would have to show that prior to 1997, licensed owners were using their registered handguns to commit murders. This would then have changed after 1997. No such observations can be made and no such shift has occurred. These facts alone, demonstrated by the AIC's own figures, show that their contention is entirely misconceived. The AIC again fails to make the clear distinction between legitimate recreational firearm owners and criminals.
Concluding Remarks
Government decisions should not derive from policy recommendations based on the most flimsy and unsubstantiated of surmises.
Government policies should never be about doing something urgently for the sake of appearances. Policy interventions should be based on hard evidence that has been rigorously tested for integrity, validity and relevance. In relation to the matters discussed here it is the proper role of the AIC to provide such evidence.
End Notes
Home > Research archive > 2000 > Homicide, Firearms and the AIC