British American Security Information Council presentation
at United Nations Workshop on Firearm Regulation
Statement by BASIC Analyst Geraldine O’Callaghan
Ljubljana, Slovenia
22-26 September 1997
I would like to thank the Verification Technology Information Centre, VERTIC, for sponsoring my attendance at this workshop. The statement that I submit for your consideration does not necessarily reflect the views of Vertic as it is the product of research and analysis undertaken by the British American Security Information Council, BASIC, an independent research organisation which analyses international security issues. The recommendations I will outline are the result of ongoing research by BASIC’s Project on Light Weapons which is designed to evaluate the role of light weapons (1) and small arms in regional and national security.
Background
The premise of BASIC’s recommendations is that the proliferation of light
weapons, both in conflicts and civil society, is a pervasive and continuing
problem. Firearms control is an integral part of international arms control.
The internationalisation of the gun trade enables gun control measures in one
country to affect the levels of gun-related crime and violence in other countries.
For example, the United States government's laissez faire approach to the gun
trade both within and beyond U.S. borders has led to the influx of thousands
of cheap Brazilian handguns and Chinese assault rifles and the export of U.S.
firearms to drug traffickers in regions of conflict.
Just as the absence of domestic controls undermine international restraint efforts, the presence of domestic controls may increase the likelihood of successful international restraint efforts. It will be difficult, if not impossible, to control the illicit international market in light weapons without also monitoring and controlling domestic access to weapons.
BASIC acknowledges the substantial efforts of the UN Disarmament Commission, the UN Panel of Experts on Small Arms and the ECOSOC Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice to raise the profile of light weapons proliferation. We welcome the recommendations of the ECOSOC Resolution of 9 May 1997 on Measures to Regulate Firearms. Due to time constraints I will limit my recommendations to practical measures for implementing the aims of this resolution in the following areas:
-
information sharing
-
destruction of weapons
-
strengthening legislation
-
the illicit weapons trade and end user verification
-
banning and limiting certain categories of weapons
For detailed information on the recommendations proposed I refer you to the paper "Overcoming Domestic Obstacles to Light Weapons Control" written by Dr. Natalie J. Goldring, Director of BASIC’s Project on Light Weapons,.
BASIC’s Recommendations
1. International co-operation
on information sharing
Various offices of the United Nations, regional bodies such as the Organization
of American States, and governments all maintain statistics and databases on
light weapons issues. However this information is not collated in one place
for easy access by governments or the general public.
Recommendations
-
Develop a system for centralised information collection and dissemination to provide accessible data on national legislation, international agreements and statistics on firearms-related issues, such as gun deaths, seizures and control efforts (e.g. public destruction, amnesties).
-
Promote transparency of light weapons flows through the development of international and regional registers on the import, export and national production of light weapons. (e.g. through regional organisations such as OAS, OAU, ASEAN and sub-regional organisations such as ECOWAS or SADC)
2. Regulatory approaches to firearms control (2)
2.1 Destruction
Weapons seized or collected after a conflict or through civilian amnesties
are seldom destroyed. They later return to circulation as the result of poor
stockpile management, theft, or discrepancies between domestic control efforts
and export policies. In times of tension, warehouses can be broken into and
weapons stolen, as occurred recently in Albania. (3) Among others, the governments of Zambia, South Africa, the Netherlands and
the US have all reported thefts of light weapons and small arms parts from
military personnel and military installations. In the US alone, approximately
300,000 firearms are reported stolen to the FBI every year.
In addition, "leftover" weapons from areas of conflict are not subject to adequate enforcement of existing laws. For example, the United States left an estimated 1.8 million small arms in Vietnam, including nearly 800,000 M-16 rifles. These weapons are now recirculating around the world. A recent weapons seizure in California consisted of weapons and weapons parts initially shipped from US stockpiles left in Vietnam. (4)
Recommendations
In line with the UN Panel of Experts on Small Arms, the Commission should:
-
Encourage mandatory and public destruction as an element in all weapons collection efforts (e.g. gun amnesties, seizures of illegal weapons). This will ensure that weapons are permanently taken out of circulation.
-
Recommend destruction policies as a priority within the demobilisation process and peacekeeping mandates to prevent military weapons entering civil society.
-
Provide training, technical assistance, and an international support fund for destruction efforts. (5)
-
Encourage precise record-keeping of collections/seizures as well as losses and destructions
2.2 Improving domestic legislation
in post-conflict societies
In post-conflict societies, it is often the case that domestic legislation controlling
the possession of weapons is either too lax or has not been enforced.
Recommendation
The Commission should:
-
Advocate the immediate review of domestic legislation governing weapons possession in conflict regions.
-
As part of the post-conflict reconstruction process, states should impose or enforce existing licensing requirements on civilian possession of small arms and light weapons.
3. Illicit weapons trade
3.1 Illicit weapons trafficking and end user verification
Once a conflict ends, it is often extremely difficult for authorities to regain
control of weapons that have flooded the country. For former combatants, with
few marketable skills, weapons become a form of currency. In order to survive,
they may use them for banditry or trade them within the civilian market for
other goods. The market in illicit weapons often results in the dramatic increase
in violence in civil society in regions of conflict. In El Salvador, for example,
more people have died from criminal violence each year since the end of the
civil war than in combat than during the years leading up to the peace accords.
The wide availability of automatic weapons, such as AK47's, in Mozambique and Angola has flooded Southern Africa with illicit weapons. South Africa has become one of the biggest market for the import and smuggling in of light weapons This in turn has fuelled a crime wave. A far higher proportion of crime in South Africa now involves the threat or use of a firearm. Out of the 18,312 murders committed in 1994, over 32 percent were committed with small arms and light weapons. During the same year there were 68,320 armed robberies, over 63 percent involved the use of firearms. (6)
Efforts to address illicit weapons trafficking require a dual track approach - controls and co-operation at the national and regional level. One approach that combines national and regional elements is the "Draft Convention Against the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking of Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials," (7) currently being developed in the Organization of American States. The initiative outlines proposals for:
-
harmonized import/export certificate systems;
-
end user documentation;
-
the marking of weapons at the point of manufacture and the point of import.
By standardising legal import and export licensing procedures, participating states will have a much clearer understanding of scale of the illicit weapons trafficking problem within the region.
Recommendations
Following
the recommendations of the UN Panel of Experts on Small Arms in July 1997,
the Commission should:
-
encourage other regional organisations to replicate the OAS initiative;
-
recommend that the European Union initiative on illicit weapons should follow the model proposed by the OAS, especially with regard to marking weapons at the point of manufacture and import.
3.2 Illicit weapons trafficking and drug routes
There are clear links between narcotics trafficking and the light weapons trade,
including shared supply and transit routes, use of light weapons for "protection"
among drug traffickers, and funding gun-running through the drug trade and vice
versa. The political will of governments is much stronger on the issue of controlling
narcotics trafficking. However, if governments are serious about stopping the
drug trade, they need to begin to address the light weapons trade. Some drug
control efforts have begun to collect information on related firearms offences
and seizures, such as the Organization of American States Inter-American Drug
Abuse Control Commission.
Recommendations
-
Use drug cooperation as a model for international cooperation in controlling light weapons. For example, the Organization of American States has a comprehensive programme on narcotics control that attempts to compile country statistics on related seizures of firearms.
-
Investigate the feasibility of incorporating light weapons control into existing international drug control efforts.
4. Banning and limiting certain types of weapons in civil society
4.1 Links between military and civilian weapons
To date, military and civilian light weapons issues have been largely viewed
as independent phenomena. In general, there has been little focus on international
consequences of light weapons transfers in the development of national legislation
even though the distinction between arms control and firearms control has become
increasingly blurred. As military weapons are diffused into civil society, their
lethality is a cause for concern. This military-style weaponry, which has a
far higher potential for violence, is now available widely on the international
market. A semi-automatic civilian version of an M-16 can easily be converted
into a fully automatic military-style weapon by installing a component widely
available in the US from magazines and spare part shops.
Lax domestic legislation can clearly encourage international light weapons trafficking. National legislation on light weapons ranges from very lax to extremely stringent. Such inconsistencies can lead to situations in which lax laws in one country may fuel illegal trade into a neighboring country (e.g. US gun-running into Mexico and Canada). The reduction of international violence will require international cooperation and will require governments to acknowledge that the nature of light weapons, including their portability, value on the black market, and difficult traceability is such that each country's domestic situation cannot be viewed in isolation. Just as the underground economy is a global system with limited regard for international borders, so too must controls on light weapons proliferation take place on the international level.
Recommendations
-
Centralize information collection on military and civilian issues.
-
Address links between military and civilian light weapons issues in international fora and develop control measures that deal with the blurring between the two categories.
-
Enforce existing laws governing sales of weapons and to provide sufficient resources to control national borders.
4.2 International laws on certain classes of weapons
One option is to ban entire categories of weapons that are especially indiscriminate
in their effects. International agreements on particular types of weapons, such
as dumdum bullets, have successfully banned these weapons, largely based on
outspoken international opinion in favor of a ban on humanitarian grounds. Similar
approaches are being taken internationally towards blinding lasers and anti-personnel
landmines. Although national efforts have successfully banned classes of light
weapons such as assault rifles. Domestic legislation banning certain weapons
is not always matched with similar export bans. For example, Japanese and UK
regulations ban certain weapons domestically but do not necessarily ban exports
of the same weapons.
Recommendations
-
Promote international agreements to ban the manufacture, import, export, and possession of junk guns (handguns which lack essential safety features) and other dangerous weapons such as Saturday Night Specials (non-sporting, low-quality handguns) and weapons deemed to be a particular public health risk (e.g. armour piercing ammunition, non-detectable firearms, casuals ammunition).
-
Encourage consistency between domestic control and export policies - a weapon deemed dangerous for import/manufacture/sale in one country should then by definition be banned for export.
4.3 Limiting ammunition supplies
Limiting ammunition holds promise in helping to break the cycle of violence.
Even if all transfers of light weapons were stopped today, the world would still
be awash in them decades from now, because light weapons can last that long.
But ammunition is rapidly consumed in conflict. Ammunition is also unattractive
for smuggling, since it has relatively high weight and relatively low dollar
value. Reliable (safe) ammunition is also difficult to produce. Ammunition also
has a significantly shorter shelf-life than the weapons in which it is used.
For all of these reasons, limitations on ammunition supplies may be more feasible
than limitations on the weapons themselves.
Recommendation
-
In line with the UN Panel of Experts on Small Arms, the Commission should recommend that the UN should initiate a study on the problems of ammunition and explosives.
Conclusion
To control light weapons internationally, it will be necessary to control
them nationally. It is therefore vital for the various UN efforts to work
together in developing policy recommendations that enable cooperation at a
regional and international level.
Endnotes
(1) The working definition used
by BASIC's Project on Light Weapons defines light weapons as including pistols
and revolvers, rifles, machine guns, portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft
weapons, mortars up to 100mm, associated ammunition, and anti-personnel mines.
Major conventional weapons are understood to include: tanks, airplanes, ships,
helicopters, mortars 100mm or over, artillery, anti-armour mines, armored
personnel carriers, and non-portable missiles and missile launchers.
(2) See UN ECOSOC Resolution
on Measures to Regulate Firearms, 9 May 1997 5 (a) and (c).
(3) See, for example, Christine
Spolar, "Many Guns, Few Solutions in Albania: Looting of Armories Litters
Chaotic Country With Weapons," Washington Post, 12 March 1997, and Mike
O’Cooner, "Albanians Struggling to Survive, Sell Stolen Rifles,"
New York Times, 24 April 1997.
(4) Valerie Alvord, "Illegal
weapons were well-traveled: Mexico-bound, they went round the world to San
Diego," San Diego Union Tribune, March 21, 1997.
(5) Examples of successful destruction
efforts:
• In March of 1996, the
UN set up an initiative to demilitarize Central Africa. The Mali government
held a bonfire in Timbuktu, destroying more than 2600 light weapons, including
machine guns, grenade launchers, rifles, and pistols, surrendered by Tuareg
fighters. 95 percent of the weapons were in working condition, and many
were in better condition than the Malian Army's weapons.
• El Salvador is embarking
on its fourth `guns for goods’ programme. Those returning weapons are
not given cash but coupons for food, shoes and other items. In a country
of just six million people, it is estimated that 250,000 weapons of war,
bazookas, mortars, grenades remain in circulation. The 3,050 weapons and
49,000 rounds of ammunition that have been handed in will be made into a
sculpture of a plough. Authorities predict that, at best, they will round
up 10 percent of all weapons in private hands but the symbolic action of
destroying weapons is regarded as having an important psychological impact on society.
(6) Chris Smith, Light Weapons and the International Arms Trade in 'Small
Arms Management and Peacekeeping in Southern Africa' UNIDIR Disarmament and Conflict
Resolution Project.
(7) "Draft Convention Against
the Illicit Manufacturing and Trafficking of Firearms, Ammunition, Explosives
and Other Related Materials," OEA/Ser.G CP/doc.2875/97, 20 March 1997,
Organization of American States Permanent Council.
Contact information for the British
American Security Information Council
USA: 1900 L Street NW, Suite 401, Washington, DC 20036
phone: +1.202.785.1266
fax: +1.202.387.62.98
UK: Carrara House, 20 Embankment Place, London WC2N 6NN
phone: +44.(0)171.925.0862
fax: +44.(0)171.925.0861
Home > Research archive > 1997 > British American Security Information Council presentation at United Nations Workshop on Firearm Regulation